Kenneth Walden v. Allstate Ins Co by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-26-2010 
Kenneth Walden v. Allstate Ins Co 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Kenneth Walden v. Allstate Ins Co" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 889. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/889 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-223 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1193
___________
KENNETH WALDEN; 
SHARON WALDEN,
Appellants
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 09-00040)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 17, 2010
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(filed: July 26, 2010 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Kenneth and Sharon Walden believe they suffered injuries as a result of living in a
moldy rental unit owned by Robert and Lucille Prato.  The Waldens filed a claim with the
      Although the Waldens did not file their notice of appeal within 30 days of the District1
Court’s order, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), the court’s order was not set out
in a separate document in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).  See In re Cendant Corp.
Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an order containing extensive
factual background does not satisfy the separate document rule).  As a consequence, the
Waldens’ appeal is timely.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii); Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(c)(2)(B).  
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Pratos’ home insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).  When Allstate denied
their claim, the Waldens sued both Allstate and the Pratos in state court.  After failing to
obtain relief in state court, the Waldens filed a complaint in federal court alleging that
Allstate had illegally denied their claim on account of their race.  Allstate moved to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The Waldens then moved to
amend their complaint.  By order entered November 9, 2009, the District Court granted
Allstate’s motion, denied the Walden’s motion to amend, and dismissed the complaint. 
The Waldens appealed.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the
District Court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  See Lora-Pena v. F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503,
505 (3d Cir. 2008).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations omitted);
see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (complainant must
“provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief [with] more than labels and conclusions .
. ..”).  We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s denial of a motion for leave
3to amend the complaint.  See Krantz v. Prudential Inv. Fund Mgmt., 305 F.3d 140, 144
(3d Cir. 2002).
In their written submission on appeal, the Waldens do not appear to contest the
District Court’s rulings.  In any event, after review of the record we conclude that the
District Court’s decision must be affirmed; the Waldens’ complaint offers nothing beyond
bald assertions and unsupported conclusions.  Strikingly, although the complaint alleges
racial discrimination by Allstate employees, it does not indicate the race of any persons
involved in the suit, including the Waldens.  The complaint merely states that the
Waldens “cannot get their personal injuries claims [sic] because of [their] race and we
have [proof].”  No facts that could be suggestive of such “proof” are offered.  And though
doing so would not, by itself, be sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Waldens
do not even set forth “a formulaic recitation of the elements of [their] cause of action.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting
Allstate’s motion to dismiss. 
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Waldens’ motion to amend.  As the District Court stated in its order, “the Walden’s have
unsuccessfully attempted to sue Allstate on these same personal injury claims twice in
Delaware state court.”  Given that the Waldens face an obvious preclusion problem,
allowing them to amend their complaint would have been an act of futility.     
There being no substantial question presented by the Waldens’ appeal, we will
4summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
